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Abstract
We analyze the formation of rival leagues and deterrence by incumbent leagues
in professional team sports, which is one of the least studied forms of competition in
sports. We first survey the economic history of professional sport leagues in North
America and develop stylized facts about rival league formation. We then develop
a game-theoretical model to explain some of these interesting stylized facts, showing
that if the bargaining power of the incumbent league is sufficiently small, i.e., less
than a certain cutoff, the incumbent should choose expansion to deter the rival league
formation; otherwise, it is optimal for the incumbent league to allow a rival league
formation and then merge with it, conditional on being successful. We further show
that the incumbent league may pay players relatively high salaries as an alternative
way to deter formation by a rival league.
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1 Introduction
Competition in sports takes many forms: competition between players, teams in a league
during the regular and post-season, nations in international contests and others. Little
research examines competition between leagues in the same sport. This lack of attention is
curious, because many rival leagues have formed in North America.
Why are single dominant monopoly leagues observed when rival leagues periodically
form? Despite increases in population and income, no competing dominant leagues exist in
any professional team sport in North America. Firms in any industry would prefer to merge
to monopoly, but antitrust laws prevent this outcome in other settings. Sports leagues enjoy
special protection from antitrust laws through exemptions.1 However, the presence of special
antitrust treatment does not ensure that a single dominant league is an equilibrium outcome;
it simply permits the firms in the industry to merge to monopoly without legal consequences.
We also address a related issue: why do monopoly leagues pay relatively high salaries to
players? This question has received significant attention in the literature. The most com-
mon explanation is that professional athletes have rare abilities and high marginal revenue
products (MRP). While both have appeal, the rare skill plus high MRP explanation appears
incomplete in some respects; minor league players with skills similar to major leaguers earn
much lower salaries, and professional sports teams are relatively small firms and often claim
to generate little or no profits.
We develop a game-theoretic model to analyze rival sports league formation and deter-
rence by an incumbent league. We model the dominant league as a monopsonist facing an
upward-sloping labor supply curve and a monopolist in the output market.2 Without a rival,
the incumbent league maximizes profits when the number of teams is less than the number
1In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs the Supreme
Court ruled that MLB was not engaged in interstate commerce and thus exempt from antitrust laws; this
1922 ruling was upheld in Toolson v. New York Yankees (1952) and Flood v. Kuhn (1972). The 1961 Sports
Broadcasting Act (SBA) explicitly exempted the merger of the NFL and AFL from antitrust law. Mid-South
Grizzlies v. NFL (1983) affirmed the NFL monopoly in the SBA and the NFL’s ability to restrict entry. In
United States Football League v. National Football League, the rival USFL sued the NFL on the grounds that
the NFL monopolized football in the US. The jury found in favor of the USFL and awarded $1 in damages,
trebled to $3 as required by the Clayton Act.
2Boal and Ransom (1997) survey models of monoposony in labor markets including models like the one
developed here.
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of cities that could support a team. The presence of a rival league, which successfully forms
with some probability, drives up wages. The rival’s probability of success depends on the
effort (investment) and the number of teams in the rival league. Conditional on a successful
rival league formation, to prevent an increase in players’ wages, both the incumbent and
the rival leagues have an incentive to merge.3 After merger, the incumbent league shares
revenues with the successful rival via a Nash bargaining.
We show that if the bargaining power of the incumbent league is greater than a certain
cutoff value, the incumbent should optimally allow the rival league to form. Further, if the
rival league formation is successful, the incumbent then chooses to merge with the rival.
However, if the bargaining power of the incumbent league is less than a certain cutoff value,
the incumbent should optimally choose to expand the current league to open cities to deter
potential formation by a rival league. We also consider an alternative deterrent to rival
league formation, where the incumbent league does not expand but pays relatively high
salaries to players. This strategy sheds light on why monopoly sports leagues pay relatively
high salaries to players.
Relatively little prior research focused on modeling rival league formation in professional
sports. Quirk and Fort (1997) developed a model of profits earned by incumbent and rival
leagues, and the interaction between these leagues, featuring host city heterogeneity in that
some cities can support two teams while others only one. Their model features competition
between leagues that reduces the profits earned by all teams due to competition for fans and
players; it explains deterrence of rival league formation only through the presence of side
payments from the incumbent league to potential rival league owners.
Cyrenne (2009) develops a similar model to explain strategic interaction among teams
in an existing professional sport league. Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008) and Madden (2011)
develop similar models of within-league strategic interaction. Grossmann, Dietl, and Lang
(2010) develop a dynamic model of the behavior of teams in a sports league. In contrast
to Grossmann, Dietl, and Lang (2010), our model generates deterrence of a rival league
3A large body of literature on entry and deterrence in a market exists in the industrial organization
literature. More details on the theoretical analysis and applications of entry, deterrence, and accommodation
can be found in chapter 8 of Tirole (1994). See Farrell and Shapiro (1990), McAfee and Williams (1992),
Pesendorfer (2005), Nocke and Whinston (2010), and Nocke and Whinston (2013) for a discussion of mergers
among firms.
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as an equilibrium outcome through either league expansion by the incumbent or merger
between the two leagues. Moreover, our model provides an additional explanation of why
the incumbent league pays high salaries to players.
2 North American Leagues
There has been no shortage of new competitors for professional team sports in North
America, yet a single top-level league currently exists in professional football, basketball,
baseball, and hockey. The population of the United States and Canada exceeds 340 million,
which seems large enough to support multiple leagues playing at the top level in any team
sport. The population of the US and Canada in 1901 was more than 80 million and there
were two professional baseball leagues, the National League (NL) and American League
(AL), playing at the highest level at that time. The primary source of revenue in 1901 was
game day attendance, which was limited by the number of people who lived nearby.
If a market with more than 80 million potential fans can support two baseball leagues
playing at the top level, why can’t an integrated market with almost 350 million potential
fans that generates ticket, broadcast and sponsorship revenues support other leagues? Total
AL and NL attendance in 1901 was 3.6 million, or 43 attendees per 1,000 population; total
attendance in Major League Baseball (MLB), which consists of the now merged AL and NL,
in 2010 was 76 million, or 210 per 1,000 population. The number of teams increased from
16 to 30 over this period; in 1901 there was one top level baseball team for every 5.1 million
potential fans; in 2010 there was one for every 11.4 million.
In each of the four “major” professional team sports in North America, at least one rival
league has formed to compete with the dominant league. Table 1 summarizes rival league
formation and expansion. “Incumbent Players Hired” shows the number of players from the
incumbent league who appeared on a roster in the rival league in the first season, a measure
of how many players from the existing league were hired by teams in the rival league. When
this column contains a “D” it means that, in addition to signing veteran players from the
incumbent league, the rival league also operated a competing amateur player entry draft, a
mechanism that assigns the rights of new players to specific teams, and competed with the
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incumbent league for new talent.
Baseball was the first professional team sport in North America, and the first rival leagues
also emerged in this sport. The first incumbent league in baseball was the National League
(NL), formed in 1876. There were a number of rival baseball leagues formed in the 19th
century, but we do not consider those leagues here. Quirk and Fort (1997) describe these
early rival leagues. The rival American League (AL) formed in 1901. After only two seasons,
the National League merged with all 8 AL teams to form Major League Baseball (MLB).
MLB also faced a challenge from the rival Federal League (FL) early.
Consider deterrence and the Continental League (CL) episode in the late 1950s. The
CL existed as a legal entity with eight prospective teams (New York, Minneapolis, Denver,
Houston, Toronto, Buffalo, Atlanta and Dallas). New York City’s population had 7.7 million
residents and only one MLB team, the Yankees, after the Giants and Dodgers moved to
San Francisco and Los Angeles in 1957. Faced with the credible prospect of a rival league
forming, especially in New York City, MLB agreed to expand and specifically to put a new
team in New York. The CL shut down without playing a game; team owners were given first
opportunity to buy expansion teams. Three of the four MLB 1961-1962 expansion teams
went to CL cities, including the New York Mets; all of the proposed hosts cities for CL teams
eventually became the home of MLB teams except Buffalo, NY.
The National Football League (NFL) has been the incumbent football league since 1920.
The NFL has faced many rival leagues over the years, and two of them succeeded in merging
teams into the NFL. Four different rival leagues with the name American Football League
(AFL) are identified by Roman numerals on Table 1. The NFL also faced a recent rival
league challenge, the United States Football League, in 1983-1985.4 The rival American
Football League (AFL) I signed only one NFL player in 1926. That player, Red Grange,
was the most talented and well known football player of that time; for this reason, the AFL
I was regarded as a legitimate rival league.
Basketball was the last major team sport to professionalize in North America; the incum-
bent National Basketball Association (NBA) formed in 1949. Professional basketball teams
4The XFL, an 8 team league created by pro wrestling impresario Vince McMahon, played a single season
in 2001 and is not generally regarded as a true rival league.
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Table 1: North American Rival Leagues and Incumbent League Expansion 1901-2010
Incumbent First Seasons Incumbent
League Year Event Year Played Players Hired Outcome
NL 1876 Rival: AL 1901 2 113 Full merger
MLB 1903 Rival: Federal 1914 2 80 Bankrupt
(baseball) Rival: Continental 1958 0 0 Deterred
Expansion 1961, 1962 2 new teams
Expansion 1969 4 new teams
Expansion 1977, 1993, 1996 2 new teams
NFL 1920 Rival: AFL I 1926 1 1 Bankrupt
(football) Expansion 1931 1 new team
Expansion 1933 3 new teams
Rival: AFL II 1936 2 1D Bankrupt
Rival: AFL III 1940 2 0D Bankrupt
Rival: AAFC 1946 4 132D 4 of 9
teams merged
Expansion 1960 1 new team
Rival: AFL IV 1960 6 106D Full merger
Expansion 1961, 1966, 1967 1 new team
Rival: WFL 1974 2 73D Bankrupt
Expansion 1976 2 new teams
Rival: USFL 1983 3 222D Bankrupt
Expansion 1995 2 new teams
Expansion 1999, 2002 1 new team
NBA 1949 Rival: ABL 1961 2 < 10 Bankrupt
(basketball) Expansion 1961 1 new team
Rival: ABA 1967 9 30D 4 of 6
teams merged
Expansion 1970 3 new teams
Expansion 1974, 1980 1 new team
Expansion 1988, 1989, 1995 2 new teams
Expansion 2004 1 new team
NHL 1917 Expansion 1924, 1925 2 new teams
(hockey) Expansion 1926 3 new teams
Expansion 1967 6 new teams
Expansion 1970 2 new teams
Expansion 1972 2 new teams
Rival: WHA 1972 7 76D 4 of 16
teams merged
Expansion 1974 2 new teams
Expansion 1991 1 new team
Expansion 1992, 1993 2 new teams
Expansion 1998, 1999 1 new team
Expansion 2000 2 new teams
D: Rival league operated a competing entry draft for new players. Multiple years on a row identifies
multiple expansions. For example, the NHL expanded by one team in 1998 and 1999.
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existed prior to this, but were primarily short-lived leagues that were not generally regarded
as dominant, incumbent leagues. The NBA faced two rival leagues, and one, the American
Basketball Association, succeeded in merging four teams into the NBA in the 1970s. The
National Hockey League (NHL), which formed at about the same time as the NFL, faced
a single rival league, the World Hockey Association, that formed in the early 1970s, played
seven seasons, and succeeded in merging four teams into the NHL.
From Table 1, rival leagues frequently compete with incumbent leagues for players. Many
of these rival leagues hired a significant number of veteran players away from the incumbent
league, and often operated rival entry drafts that allocated incoming players to teams in the
new league. These competing entry drafts also lead to intense competition between the rival
and incumbent league over new players. Most of the rival leagues shown on Table 1 formed
before detailed data about player salaries were widely available. Kahn (2000) documents
the changes in player compensation that took place in several incumbent leagues after the
formation of a rival league.
Teams avoid competing for new players coming into leagues, either through tacit collusion
or through institutional devices like the “reserve clause” and entry drafts. The “reserve
clause” assigned each players’ rights to the team that owns the contract in perpetuity up until
1976, and still applies to young players in all four leagues. The formation of a rival league
leads to increased competition for players, driving up salaries for all professional players in
the sport. Even under the reserve clause, a player could not be contractually prohibited from
signing a contract with a rival league. Kahn (2000) reports significant increases in salaries in
incumbent leagues after the formation of a rival league in all four professional team sports in
North America. Table 2 summarizes the increases in average salaries in incumbent leagues
in North America after the formation of a rival league, in nominal dollars.
Salaries in the NL and MLB increased by about 50% in the early part of the 20th century
after rival leagues formed. In later instances where rival leagues formed, average salaries in
the incumbent leagues by between about 200% in the NFL and more than 700% in the
NBA. Only 30 former NBA players were on ABA rosters in the rival league’s first season
of operation, although a number of star players signed with the ABA, and this rival league
also operated a successful rival draft. This suggests that a relatively small number of players
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Table 2: Average Nominal Salary Increases Before and After Rival League Formation
Average Incumbent Average Incumbent
Incumbent League Rival League Year League Salary Before League Salary After
NL (baseball) American 1901 $2,000 $3,000
MLB (baseball) Federal 1914 $3,000 $5,000
NBA (basketball) ABA 1967 $20,000 $143,000
NHL (ice hockey) WHA 1972 $25,000 $96,000
NFL (football) USFL 1982 $55,288 $102,250
Source: Kahn (2000)
attracted from the incumbent league to play in the rival league can generate substantial
increases in salaries. These increases in salaries would also be reflected in similar large
increases in total team wage bills in the incumbent league.
Kahn (2000) also documents that after the merger of the AL and NL in 1903, and after
the demise of the Federal League in 1915, salaries in MLB returned to their pre-rival levels
in real and nominal terms; the salary increases experienced by both leagues were temporary,
and after the merger returned to a monoposony induced lower level. The Reserve Clause
was in effect at this time, so teams could unilaterally increase or decrease salaries from
year to year. Salaries did not decline much in the NBA, NHL and NFL after their rival
league episodes. However, these rivals formed at the beginning of the free agency period
in professional sports, which reduced the monoposony power wielded by leagues. In this
environment, salaries would not be as flexible as they were in the early 19th century.
Several “stylized facts” emerge from this discussion. First, rival leagues periodically ap-
pear and challenge the supremacy of incumbent leagues. Second, the only observed outcomes
from rival league formation are either the rival league fails or teams in the rival league merge
into the incumbent league. Despite significant population and real income growth, no ri-
val league formed and continued to operate in competition with the incumbent league; the
co-existence of multiple dominant leagues does not appear to be an equilibrium outcome.
Third, incumbent leagues periodically expand into cities without teams. We posit that
this expansion attempts to deter the formation of rival leagues.5 Finally, rival leagues hire
5Some expansion took place because jet air travel reduced the time required to cross the country. Congress
has also periodically held hearings focused on expansion of the number of professional teams in US leagues,
including in 1958, just before the New York Giants and Dodgers moved to California, and in 1995 after
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players away from incumbent leagues, and often operate competing entry drafts, generating
significant increases in salaries in incumbent leagues.
3 A Model of League Behavior and Interaction
Consider an existing incumbent sports league, which operates as a monopsonist, as the
sole demander of professional athletes in the labor market and as a monopolist, as the sole
provider of professional sports events in the product market. The market contains N cities
large enough to support a team. To simplify the model, we assume that the N cities in this
market are homogenous, in terms of their size, population, and revenue generating potential.
The league determines the number of teams in the league, not the allocation of teams
to cities. Let 2 ≤ n ≤ N be the number of the teams in the league.6 Each team operates
as a monopolist in a city, earning revenues P > 0. The number of teams n in the league
determines total revenues R(n) generated by the league, R(n) = P · n. We assume that
the league operates as a syndicate, in that all revenues generated are shared equally by the
teams in the leagues.7 Let W (n) denote the wage function, where w > 0 and W (n) = w · n,
and thus the total wage cost for the league is W (n) · n.8 The incumbent league’s profit is
R(n)−W (n) · n > 0, for all n ∈ [2, N ]. (1)
the Cleveland Browns moved to Baltimore to become the Ravens, and in several other instances. Congress
has systematically upheld statutory exemptions from anti trust law granted to professional sports teams,
although the possibility of statutorily ending this exemption has frequently been raised at hearings.
6All North American leagues limit the number of players each team can have under contract. The roster
size limit is not under complete control of the league; this limit is set during collective bargaining between
the league and player unions. Modeling this interaction is beyond the scope of this paper. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that the number of players is identical across all teams, and only consider how many
teams a league needs to maximize total revenue. Others have modeled the supply of players as a fixed pool
of talent, see Kahn (2007).
7Quirk and Fort (1997) and Vrooman (1997) make a similar assumption. While this does not reflect the
complexity of actual revenue sharing arrangements in professional sports leagues, it simplifies the analysis
considerably.
8Besides the wage bill, teams also incur other operational costs, such as stadium expenses, advertising,
etc. We here omit them to simplify the analysis. An examination of leaked audited financial data from
professional sports teams and sporadically published expense estimates from various media sources suggests
that payroll expenses account for about 2/3 of total expenses incurred by professional sports teams in North
America. Administrative and general costs, including front-office costs, travel, and training expenses are the
second most important expense. Stadium and arena expenses are generally low because of the large public
subsidies that many teams receive for the construction and operation of facilities.
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The league chooses n∗ to maximize profit, where n∗ satisfies
R′(n∗)−W ′(n∗) · n∗ −W (n∗) = 0. (2)
Simplifying shows P = W ′(n∗) · n∗ + W (n∗), or n∗ = P
2w
. We assume that 2 ≤ n∗ ≤ N , so
the profit maximizing league size leaves (N − n∗) ≥ 2 cities without teams.
This assumption has empirical support. In North America, not every city large enough
to support a professional sports franchise has one. Los Angeles has not had an NFL team
since 1994. In 2010, 8 of the 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in the US did
not have a pro sports team (Riverside CA, population 4.3 million, Las Vegas, NV, 1.9m,
Austin, TX, 1.7m, Virginia Beach, VA, 1.7m, Providence, RI, 1.6m, Louisville, KY, 1.3m,
Hartford, CT, 1.2m, and Birmingham, AL, 1.1m). Birmingham has 2,000 fewer people than
Buffalo (50th largest MSA), home to NFL and NHL teams. Green Bay, WI, population
309,000 (152nd largest MSA) and home to an NFL team, is an exception. n∗ < N appears
to be a reasonable assumption based on the distribution of teams across cities.
The incumbent league faces a scenario where n∗ > (N − n∗) ≥ 2 cities without teams
represent a potentially profitable environment for a rival league. The incumbent league faces
two choices: either expand into cities with no teams to deter a rival league from forming or
do not expand and let a rival league form.
If the incumbent league chooses to expand into the (N − n∗ − 1) cities without teams,
profits are R(N − 1)−w(N − 1) · (N − 1), and rival league formation does not occur.9 If the
incumbent league chooses to allow a rival league to form, then the rival league places teams
in the (N − n∗) open cities. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no overlap in
cities between the two leagues, which ensures that each team is a monopolist, implying no
interaction between the two leagues in terms of demand by local fans.
Whether or not a rival league succeeds depends on two factors. First, compared to
the incumbent league, a rival league may lack sufficient organization, marketing, or team
quality to attract fans. The rival league invests effort into league formation; intuitively,
the more effort the rival league invests, the greater the probability of success. Second, the
9A one team league is impossible, so the incumbent league only needs to expand to N − 1 cities to deter
rival league formation.
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number of teams in the rival league affects success; more teams make the rival league more
attractive, increasing the probability of success. Assume rival league formation succeeds
with probability 0 ≤ q(e, k) ≤ 1, where e ∈ [0,∞) reflects effort or investment by the rival
league, and k is the number of teams.
Assumption (1a.): For k ∈ [2, N ], q(0, k) = 0, and q(∞, k) = 1, ∂q(e, k)/∂e > 0, and
∂2q(e, k)/∂e2 < 0.
Assumption (1b.): For e > 0, q(e, k = 1) = q(e, k = 0) = 0, and for k ≥ 1, q(e, k + 1) >
q(e, k).
If unsuccessful, the rival league earns zero revenues and the incumbent league earns R(n∗)−
w(n∗) ·n∗. If successful, both leagues operate concurrently and the incumbent and rival earn
R(n∗) and R(N−n∗), respectively. Since q(e, k+1) > q(e, k) and n∗ > (N−n∗) ≥ 2, N−n∗
is the optimal number of teams in the rival league.
Successful rival league formation increases demand for players. With N teams the wages
increase to W (N) and payoffs become R(n∗) −W (N) · n∗ > 0 and R(N − n∗) −W (N) ·
(N − n∗) > 0 for the incumbent and rival, respectively. To ensure that the rival league has
an incentive to form, given n∗ teams in the incumbent league, we assume
Assumption 2: q(e,N − n∗)
[
R(N − n∗)−W (N) · (N − n∗)
]
− e ≥ 0 for e > 0.
To reduce salaries, the incumbent and successful rival leagues merge and form a single
united league. This merger will benefit both by reducing the number of teams; clearly, it
is optimal for the merged league to reduce the number of teams to n∗, reducing wages to
W (n∗). 10 In the merged league, the incumbent divides the benefits from the merger with
the rival league via a Nash bargaining game, where δ and 1− δ reflect bargaining power for
the incumbent and rival, respectively, and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Given this setup, the timing of the game consists of three stages:
Stage One: The incumbent decides to either expand or let a rival league form;
10In Section 4, we discuss how dynamic entry from rival leagues affects the number of teams in the merged
league. This provides insight into why a merged league may contain some or all of the teams from the rival
league.
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Stage Two: After observing the incumbent’s decision, if the incumbent chooses to expand
to new cities, the rival is deterred; if the incumbent league chooses not to expand, the
rival forms a new league and invests effort e;
Stage Three: If the rival league is not successful, the rival exits and the incumbent league
maintains its monopoly position in the market. If the rival league is successful, both
leagues can choose to either operate concurrently or merge.
3.1 Rival league formation
We solve the game by backward induction. We examine the strategies (merger or com-
petition) the incumbent and the rival leagues play in Stage Three and then characterize the
optimal effort level e chosen by the rival league after formation in Stage Two.
If unsuccessful, the rival league earns zero profits and the incumbent league earns R(n∗)−
w(n∗) · n∗. We focus on the case where the rival league succeeds. When the rival and the
incumbent leagues choose to merge, it is optimal for the merged league to reduce the number
of teams to n∗. The gain from the merger is[(
R(n∗)−W (n∗) · (n∗)
)
−
(
R(N)−W (N) ·N
)]
.
Let Π denote this benefit. After a merger, the profits for the incumbent and the rival are
δ · Π +
[
R(n∗)−W (N) · n∗
]
, (3)
and
(1− δ) · Π +
[
R(N − n∗)−W (N) · (N − n∗)
]
. (4)
The payoffs for the incumbent and rival leagues are strictly larger under a merger than
without merging, conditional on the rival league formation being successful. The following
lemma summarizes decisions made by the rival and incumbent leagues in Stage Three.
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Lemma 1. Once the rival league formation is successful, the incumbent and the rival leagues
are strictly better off when merging.
We next solve the second stage of the game. If the incumbent league expands into the
(N − n∗− 1) cities with no teams, a rival will optimally choose not to form. However, if the
incumbent league chooses not to expand, the rival will choose to enter the market. Thus,
we only need to focus on the effort level e chosen by the rival league, given N − n∗. The
expected payoff from rival league formation is
q(e,N − n∗)
{
(1− δ) · Π +
[
R(N − n∗)−W (N) · (N − n∗)
]}
− e. (5)
From Assumption (2), Equation (5) is strictly greater than zero. Further, differentiating
with respect to e yields
∂q(e∗, N − n∗)
∂e∗
=
1
(1− δ) · Π +
[
R(N − n∗)−W (N) · (N − n∗)
] . (6)
The rival league’s strategy can be characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The rival league invests e∗ given by Equation (6) when forming.
3.2 Incumbent league expansion
Now consider the first stage of the game. Given the strategies from Stages two and
three, we characterize how the incumbent league decides whether to expand to deter rival
league formation or allow a rival league to form, conditional on rival league success. From
Assumptions (1.b) and (2), it is optimal for the incumbent league to expand to N − 1 open
cities.
Outcome 1: The incumbent league chooses to expand. Total profits are
R(N − 1)−W (N − 1) · (N − 1). (7)
Outcome 2: The incumbent league allows a rival league to form and then merges with
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the rival league, conditional on rival league success. The merged league reduces the
number of teams to n∗. Total expected profits are
q(e∗, N − n∗)
{
δ · Π +
[
R(n∗)−W (N) · n∗
]}
+
(
1− q(e∗, N − n∗)
)[
R(n∗)−W (n∗) · n∗
]
.
(8)
Clearly if the profits earned by the incumbent league under Outcome 1 exceed the profits
earned under Outcome 2, then the incumbent league will choose to expand to deter rival
league formation; otherwise, the incumbent league will allow a rival league to form and then
merge with that rival if and only if the new league is successful. The equilibrium in this
game is
Proposition 1. There exists a unique bargaining power δ∗ such that if δ < δ∗, the incumbent
chooses to expand to deter rival league formation. If δ ≥ δ∗, the incumbent allows a rival
league to form; the rival league invests e∗ in forming the new league; conditional on success,
the two leagues merge.
Proof. There must exist a unique bargaining power δ∗ for which the profits earned under
Outcome 1 equal the profits earned under Outcome 2:
R(N − 1)− w(N − 1) · (N − 1) = q(e∗, N − n∗)
{
δ∗ · Π +
[
R(n∗)−W (N) · n∗
]}
+
(
1− q(e∗, N − n∗)
)[
R(n∗)−W (n∗) · n∗
]
.
(9)
If δ < δ∗, implying that the profits earned by the incumbent league are greater under
Outcome 1 than under Outcome 2, then it will be optimal for the incumbent league to
expand into the other (N − n∗− 1) cities to deter rival league formation. A rival league will
not form.
If δ ≥ δ∗, indicating that the profit earned by the existing league under Outcome 1 is
less than the profit earned under Outcome 2, it is optimal for the incumbent league to allow
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a rival league to form. The rival invests e∗ and enters (N − n∗) cities to form a new league
with a probability of success q(e∗, N − n∗). If the rival league succeeds, the two leagues
merge; if the rival league is unsuccessful, the incumbent league still operates with teams in
n∗ cities.
Given Proposition (1), we have seen that the incumbent’s expansion strategy crucially
depends on whether his bargaining power is less or greater than a certain cutoff value.
Further, we are interested in examining how changes in other variables will affect the cutoff
value of the bargaining power.
Let q∗ denote the equilibrium probability of success q(e∗, N − n∗). Differentiating Equa-
tion (9) with respect to q∗ yields
∂δ∗
∂q∗
Π · q∗ =
[
R(n∗)−W (n∗) · n∗
]
−
{
δ∗ · Π +
[
R(n∗)−W (N) · n∗
]}
indicating that ∂δ
∗
∂q∗ > 0. Further, from Equation (6), it is obvious to have that
dδ∗
de∗ =
∂δ∗
∂q∗ · ∂q
∗
∂e∗ > 0. These imply that in equilibrium, when the probability of success increases
or the equilibrium effort e∗ which the rival is willing to invest increases, the cutoff value
increases and therefore it becomes more likely for the incumbent to choose to expend the
other (N − n∗ − 1) cities and deter the rival league formation.
Finally, we investigate the impacts of variables P and w on the cutoff value of the
bargaining power. Given n∗ = P
2w
, it is easy to check that when P decreases and/or w
increases, the equilibrium probability of success q∗ increases and thus the incumbent will be
more possible to choose league expansion in the sports market.
3.3 Salaries and deterrence
Professional athletes earn large salaries, perhaps because of their rare skills and high
MRP. However, this explanation may not be complete. In this section, we provide another
reason why an incumbent league would pay high salaries to players by considering an alter-
native strategy in this model: increasing players’ salaries instead of expanding to deter a
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rival league in Stage one.11 12
Let e∗ denote a rival league’s equilibrium investment. There exists a unique wage level
w∗∗ satisfying
q∗
{
(1− δ) · Π +
[
R(N − n∗)− w∗∗ · (N − n∗)
]}
− e∗ = 0. (10)
From Equation (10), when the wage level is w∗∗, a rival league is indifferent about formation.
Rival league formation will be deterred if the wage level is greater than w∗∗. There also exists
another unique wage level ŵ satisfying[
R(n∗)− ŵ · n∗
]
= q∗
{
δ · Π +
[
R(n∗)−W (N) · n∗
]}
+ (1− q∗)
[
R(n∗)−W (n∗) · n∗
]
.
(11)
Given the expression above
Proposition 2. If w∗∗ ≥ ŵ, it is optimal for the incumbent league to allow a rival league
to form and then choose to merge conditional on successful formation; if w∗∗ < ŵ, the
incumbent league prefers to increase wages to w∗∗ to deter rival league formation.
Proof. Equations (10) and (11) show that if w∗∗ ≥ ŵ, it is optimal for the incumbent league
to let a rival league form and merge with the rival league, if the rival succeeds. However, if
w∗∗ < ŵ, deterring rival league formation generates a higher payoff to the incumbent; the
incumbent strictly prefers to deter by increasing salaries.
Proposition 2 predicts that in order to deter rival league formation, the incumbent league
may pay high salaries to players, increasing the cost to potential rivals. Note that this also
mitigates the tendency for monopoly leagues to pay salaries below marginal revenue product,
increasing the welfare of players even without the presence of free agency.
11This can be interpreted as an application of “raising rivals’ costs”, see Salop and Scheffman (1987), and
Scherer (1980).
12Note that we do not address the issue of allocation of players across teams in this analysis. See Schmidt
(2011) for the discussion of the issue of the allocation of players across teams.
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4 Discussion
Repeated rival league formations. From Table 1, rival leagues repeatedly formed in
all four leagues and mergers involved some or all of the teams from rival leagues, which is
not consistent with the prediction of our model. However, in a dynamic model of rival league
formation, the merged league would not be reduced to n∗ teams. Under assumption (1b)
a merged league with N − 1 teams is the only effective deterrent to any future rival league
formation; under a less restrictive assumption about the relationship between rival league
investment and the probability of success, a merged league with fewer than N-1 teams would
deter any future rival league formation, consistent with the fact that past merged leagues
contained more teams than the existing league prior to the merger.
Table 1 also shows several different outcomes after rival-league mergers. The NBA and
NHL followed policies of franchise expansion following mergers in the late 1960s and early
1970s and saw no additional rival leagues emerge, while the NFL had to fight off two addi-
tional rival leagues after the AFL merger in the early 1960s. These outcomes suggest that
dynamics play an important role in rival league formation. Future research should extend
this model to include dynamic strategic interaction between dominant and rival leagues.
Media revenues. The significantly larger broadcast rights fees earned by leagues be-
ginning in the 1980s increased profits, which also increases the incentive for the incumbent
league to deter rival league formation. National broadcast revenues are shared equally in
North American professional sports leagues, and existing leagues may be unwilling to give
up a significant share of these revenues to one or rival league members, implying that the ex-
pansion option became relatively more attractive than the merger option, relative to earlier
times when broadcast rights fees were smaller. All of four leagues have continued to expand
periodically in the past 30 years, which is consistent with the prediction that expansion to
deter rival league formation is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Players’ Compensation. From Proposition 2, the incumbent league can also deter
rival league formation by increasing the salaries paid to players. Higher player salaries means
that a rival league will find it costly to raid teams in the incumbent league for players. This
explanation is consistent with the fact that real salaries have risen rapidly in these leagues
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since the mid 1980s and no rival league has been formed since this salary increase began.
Moreover, this would be a more effective deterrent in the NFL, which has a 45 player roster,
than in MLB, which has a 25 player roster, or in the NHL, which has a 23 player roster.
However, increases in player compensation in the 1980s and beyond also reflects the legal
erosion of the reserve clause and the advent of free agency in all four leagues.
Supply of players and league structure. The model assumes an upward sloping
labor supply function, implying that salaries rise when leagues expand. This may not be the
case in other contexts, for example in professional football in Europe, where a large pool of
players exists around the world and the labor supply curve may be flat.13
Rival league formation has never taken place in European football and league expansion
rarely occurs, because the promotion and relegation system (a chain of inter-related domestic
sports leagues in which the bottom three or four teams in each higher league are demoted to
the next lower league and the top three or four teams in the lower league are promoted to the
higher league at the end of each season) in Europe acts as an alternative deterrent to rival
league formation, reducing expansion pressure. When population growth generates a city
capable of supporting a team in the top league, a team can form in that city, join the system
at the lowest level, and over time become a member of the top league through promotion.
Promotion and relegation distributes teams across cities in the top domestic league in a way
that reduces the number of potential hosts for a rival league.
Empirical extensions. The model generates empirically testable predictions. The more
cities without teams, the larger the incentive for a rival league to form and the greater the
pressure for an existing league to expand to deter rival league formation. Annual population
estimates exist for major cities in North America, so the number of viable open cities at any
point in time can be determined. The number of viable open cities, along with other factors
like income and the number of available players, should explain both the observed formation
of rival leagues and league expansion.
13The labor supply curve in MLB and the NBA may have also gotten flatter over time. MLB has extensively
expanded its recruiting in Latin America in the last few decades and also draws players from Japan, Korea,
and even Europe and Australia. Players from Europe, South America, and China now appear on NBA
rosters.
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5 Conclusions
We develop a game-theoretic model to explain why we observe a single professional sports
league in a market that appears to be large enough to support more than one. We characterize
the incumbent league’s strategy in equilibrium, showing that if the bargaining power is
sufficiently high (i.e., greater than a cutoff value), allowing a rival league to form and then
merging with it is optimal for the incumbent league; otherwise, the incumbent should expand
into cities with no teams. Our model also provides an additional explanation for the high
salaries paid to professional athletes; the incumbent league can pay high salaries to players
to deter rival league formation. These two predictions are broadly consistent with the fact
that no rival league formed in North America since the early 1980s and salaries increased
rapidly beginning in the late 1980s.
The model suggests some interesting extensions. First, the assumption of a fixed number
of homogenous cities capable of supporting teams could be relaxed. Heterogeneity clearly
exists among cities in terms of their ability to generate revenues and support teams. Thus,
it would be interesting to see if these results still hold when introducing heterogeneity in
host cities.
Second, this analysis leaves the welfare implications of rival league expansion, and the
related issue of antitrust oversight of professional sports leagues, unexamined. Consumers
appear only as sources of revenue in this model. However, the limited supply of teams
by existing monopoly leagues leads to welfare losses for residents of cities without teams.
The formation of a rival league will generate welfare gains for these consumers, based on
increased access to teams and greater variety in entertainment options in cities that did
not have a team when only a single dominant league exists. This observation makes the
current antitrust exemption enjoyed by professional team sports in North America difficult
to motivate. An extended model including consumer preferences and budget constraints can
shed additional light on this issue.
19
References
Boal, W. M., and M. R. Ransom (1997): “Monopsony in the Labor Market,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 35(1), 86–112.
Cyrenne, P. (2009): “Modelling Professional Sports Leagues: An Industrial Organization
Approach,” Review of Industrial Organization, 34(3), 193–215.
Dietl, H. M., E. Franck, and M. Lang (2008): “Overinvestment in Team Sports
Leagues: A Contest Theory Model,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 55(3), 353–
368.
Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro (1990): “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,”
The American Economic Review, 80(1), 107–126.
Grossmann, M., H. Dietl, and M. Lang (2010): “Revenue Sharing and Competitive
Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model,” Review of Industrial Organization, 36(1), 17–36.
Kahn, L. M. (2000): “The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory,” The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 75–94.
(2007): “Sports League Expansion and Consumer Welfare,” Journal of Sports
Economics, 8(2), 115–138.
Madden, P. (2011): “Game Theoretic Analysis of Basic Team Sports Leagues,” Journal of
Sports Economics, 12(4), 407–431.
McAfee, R. P., andM. A. Williams (1992): “Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy,”
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(2), 181–187.
Nocke, V., and M. Whinston (2013): “Merger Policy with Merger Choice,” American
Economic Review, 103(2), 1006 – 1033.
Nocke, V., andM. D. Whinston (2010): “Dynamic Merger Review,” Journal of Political
Economy, 118(6), 1201 – 1251.
20
Pesendorfer, M. (2005): “Mergers Under Entry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3),
661–679.
Quirk, J. P., and R. D. Fort (1997): Pay dirt: The Business of Professional Team
Sports. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Salop, S. C., and D. T. Scheffman (1987): “Cost-Raising Strategies,” The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 36(1), 19–34.
Scherer, F. (1980): Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Boston:
Houghton Miﬄin.
Schmidt, M. B. (2011): “Institutional Change and Factor Movement in Major League
Baseball: An Examination of the Coase Theorem Invariance Principle,” Review of Indus-
trial Organization, 39(3), 187–205.
Tirole, J. (1994): The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT press.
Vrooman, J. (1997): “Franchise Free Agency in Professional Sports Leagues,” Southern
Economic Journal, 64(1), 191–219.
21
